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Abstract 
Researchers have suggested that skill performance deteriorates when 
people try to exert conscious control over automatic actions. 
Unfortunately, little is known about the effects of different types of 
conscious processing on skilled performance by expert athletes. We 
conducted two experiments to address this issue. Experiment 1 
investigated the influence of a specific form of conscious control 
(making technical adjustments to a stroke) on the putting skills of expert 
golfers. The expert golfers maintained putting proficiency (i.e. number 
of putts holed) when making technical adjustments. However, this form 
of conscious processing altered the timing and consistency of golfers' 
putting strokes. Experiment 2 compared the influence of technical 
adjustments and conscious monitoring (paying attention to the execution 
of the stroke) on expert golfers' putting skills. Technical adjustments 
had no disruptive influence on expert golfers' putting proficiency but did 
reduce the consistency of their strokes. However, conscious monitoring 
was found to impair putting proficiency. The implications of the work 
for theory and future work are discussed. 
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Introduction 
When describing their peak performances, many elite athletes indicate 
that they devote little or no conscious attention to the mechanics of their 
movement (Jackson, Martin, & Eklund, 2008 Jackson, S. A., Martin, A. 
J. and Eklund, R. C. 2008. Long and short measures of flow: The 
construct validity of the FSS-2, DFS-2, and new brief counterparts. 
Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 30: 561–587. ). In contrast, 
when expert athletes suffer performance anxiety (e.g. as happens in 
“choking”; for reviews, see Gucciardi & Dimmock, 2008 Gucciardi, D. 
F. and Dimmock, J. A. 2008. Choking under pressure in sensorimotor 
skills: Conscious processing or depleted attentional resources?. 
Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 9: 45–59. ; Hill, Hanton, Matthews, 
& Fleming, 2010 Hill, D. M., Hanton, S., Matthews, N. and Fleming, S. 
2010. Choking in sport: A review. International Review of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology, 3: 24–39. ), they may increase the amount of 
conscious attention that they devote to their movements, thereby 
interrupting automated skills and impairing subsequent performance 
(Jackson & Beilock, 2008). According to Beilock and Carr's (2001 
Beilock, S. and Carr, T. 2001. On the fragility of skilled performance: 
What governs choking under pressure?. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 130: 701–725. ) explicit monitoring hypothesis, 
consciously attending to step-by-step skilled behaviour impairs expert 
performance significantly as high-level execution is thought to be 
governed by proceduralized knowledge that is run without conscious 
attention to task components. This prediction was corroborated by 
Beilock and colleagues (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002 
Beilock, S. L., Carr, T. H., MacMahon, C. and Starkes, J. L. 2002. 
When paying attention becomes counterproductive: Impact of divided 
versus skill-focused attention on novice and experienced performance of 
sensorimotor skills. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8: 6–
16. ) in a study of the influence of skill-focused attention on the putting 
performance of experienced golfers (i.e. handicaps less than 8). When 
players attended to a specific aspect of their technique (namely, the 
exact moment that the clubhead finished its follow-through), 
performance was impaired relative to a dual-task condition in which 
they putted while performing a secondary task (an auditory tone-
monitoring activity). 
According to Masters' (1992) theory of “reinvestment” (see recent 
review by Masters & Maxwell, 2008 Masters, R. S. W. and Maxwell, J. 
2008. The theory of reinvestment. International Review of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology, 1: 160–183. ), performance breakdown is likely to 
occur when expert performers “reinvest” or manipulate conscious rule-
based knowledge in an effort to control their movements during motor 
output. Masters and Maxwell (2008 Masters, R. S. W. and Maxwell, J. 
2008. The theory of reinvestment. International Review of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology, 1: 160–183. ) identified performance-related 
pressure as the key trigger for reinvestment, which is held to exert its 
debilitating influence on performance by increasing people's self-
consciousness of their movement. This heightened self-consciousness 
may activate “conscious, explicit, rule based knowledge … to control 
the mechanics of one's movements during motor output” (Masters & 
Maxwell, 2004, p. 208). 
Although Masters and Maxwell (2004) suggested that changes in actual 
motor performance were an unintended consequence of conscious 
control, there is evidence that expert performers sometimes consciously 
change the mechanics of their movement when experiencing 
performance-related pressure. Such attempted conscious control seems 
to disrupt certain kinematic characteristics of performance. For example, 
Collins and colleagues (Collins, Jones, Fairweather, Doolan, & Priestly, 
2001) measured kinematic aspects of weightlifters' performance during 
training and competition. They also questioned these athletes about their 
conscious use of any movement change strategy. The elite weightlifters 
consciously modified their movement as a result of competitive pressure 
and such modifications led some participants to display a more 
inconsistent action. However, Collins et al. (2001 Collins, D., Jones, B., 
Fairweather, M., Doolan, S. and Priestley, N. 2001. Examining 
associated changes in movement patterns. International Journal of Sport 
Psychology, 31: 223–242. ) also reported that despite displaying more 
variable movements, participants were successful at the weightlifting 
tasks attempted. This finding suggests that although reinvestment may 
change experts' movement patterns, it may not always diminish their 
overall task performance. 
Additional evidence that performance-related pressure may induce 
performers to deliberately manipulate their actions comes from a study 
by Nicholls and colleagues (Nicholls, Holt, Polman, & James, 2005 
Nicholls, A. R., Holt, N. L., Polman, R. C. J. and James, D. W. G. 2005. 
Stress and coping among international adolescent golfers. Journal of 
Applied Sport Psychology, 17: 330–340. ). These authors identified the 
use of “technical adjustments” as one of the strategies used by a sample 
of elite adolescent golfers to deal with stress. Such adjustments included 
modifications to “swing plane, stance, grip and technique” (p. 336). 
However, although Nicholls et al. (2005 Nicholls, A. R., Holt, N. L., 
Polman, R. C. J. and James, D. W. G. 2005. Stress and coping among 
international adolescent golfers. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 
17: 330–340. ) showed that elite golfers make technical adjustments 
during competitive performance, researchers have yet to determine the 
precise mechanism by which this particular form of conscious control 
may influence performance proficiency (e.g. number of putts holed) 
and/or movement quality (e.g. kinematic aspects of skilled movements). 
How does conscious processing influence the execution of automated 
movement? Although not dealing specifically with the use of technical 
adjustments, Fitts and colleagues (Fitts, Bahrick, Noble, & Briggs, 1961 
Fitts, P., Bahrick, H., Noble, M. and Briggs, G. 1961. Skilled 
performance, New York: Wiley. ) proposed the progression-regression 
hypothesis to describe how conscious control results in a “dechunking” 
of automated movement. This hypothesis suggests that “dechunking” 
causes proceduralized control structures that normally operate without 
interruptions to be broken down into a sequence of smaller, independent 
movements in a manner representative of performance during novice 
learning (Beilock & Gray, 2007; Fitts & Posner, 1967 Fitts, P. M. and 
Posner, M. I. 1967. Human performance, Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole. ). 
Evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from studies that show that 
conscious processing can disrupt the timing and variability of expert 
movement. For example, Mullen and Hardy (2000 Mullen, R. and 
Hardy, L. 2000. State anxiety and motor performance: Testing the 
conscious processing hypothesis. Journal of Sports Sciences, 18: 785–
799. ) found that the backswing and downswing times of golfers (whose 
handicap ranged from 12 to 18) increased in an experimental condition 
in which their attention was directed to the mechanics of their putting 
strokes relative to a condition in which they received no instructions. 
Furthermore, Gray (2004 Gray, R. 2004. Attending to the execution of a 
complex sensorimotor skill: Expertise differences and slumps. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 10: 42–54. ) found that expert 
baseball players who monitored their action not only increased 
movement variability but also experienced disruption to the sequencing 
and relative timing of the different stages of their swings compared with 
performance in normal conditions. 
A limitation of the studies by Mullen and Hardy (2000 Mullen, R. and 
Hardy, L. 2000. State anxiety and motor performance: Testing the 
conscious processing hypothesis. Journal of Sports Sciences, 18: 785–
799. ) and Gray (2004 Gray, R. 2004. Attending to the execution of a 
complex sensorimotor skill: Expertise differences and slumps. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 10: 42–54. ) is that they examined 
only how conscious monitoring (i.e. attending to a specific aspect of 
technique) influences automated movement. They did not investigate 
the influence of either technical adjustments or conscious modifications 
on performance proficiency or on kinematic aspects of experts' 
movements. Therefore, to fill this gap in the research literature, in the 
current study we employed motion analysis technology to examine the 
influence of excessive conscious control (technical adjustments) on the 
putting performance of a sample of expert golfers. We also sought to 
address a persistent methodological problem in previous studies in this 
field (e.g. Beilock et al., 2002 Beilock, S. L., Carr, T. H., MacMahon, C. 
and Starkes, J. L. 2002. When paying attention becomes 
counterproductive: Impact of divided versus skill-focused attention on 
novice and experienced performance of sensorimotor skills. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8: 6–16. ; Gray, 2004 Gray, R. 
2004. Attending to the execution of a complex sensorimotor skill: 
Expertise differences and slumps. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Applied, 10: 42–54. ; Mullen & Hardy, 2000 Mullen, R. and Hardy, L. 
2000. State anxiety and motor performance: Testing the conscious 
processing hypothesis. Journal of Sports Sciences, 18: 785–
799. ) – namely, the questionable ecological validity of the experimental 
methods that purport to induce conscious processing in participants. For 
example, Mullen and Hardy (2000 Mullen, R. and Hardy, L. 2000. State 
anxiety and motor performance: Testing the conscious processing 
hypothesis. Journal of Sports Sciences, 18: 785–799. ) required 
participants to repeat aloud a coaching point that had been paraphrased 
into a verbal cue while they putted. This method has dubious ecological 
validity because “it would seem rather peculiar to observe an expert 
golfer verbalizing explicit cues or random letters when putting during a 
competition” (Gucciardi & Dimmock, 2008 Gucciardi, D. F. and 
Dimmock, J. A. 2008. Choking under pressure in sensorimotor skills: 
Conscious processing or depleted attentional resources?. Psychology of 
Sport and Exercise, 9: 45–59.p. 49). In a similar vein, Gray (2004 Gray, 
R. 2004. Attending to the execution of a complex sensorimotor skill: 
Expertise differences and slumps. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Applied, 10: 42–54. ) instructed his baseball participants to indicate 
whether their bat was moving up or down when a tone was presented; 
this secondary task has been criticized for being somewhat “contrived 
and arbitrary” (Wilson, Chattington, Marple-Horvat, & Smith, 2007 
Wilson, M., Chattington, M., Marple-Horvat, D. E. and Smith, N. C. 
2007. A comparison of self-focus versus attentional explanations of 
choking. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 29: 439–456.p. 
454). In view of these methodological problems, Wilson et al. (2007 
Wilson, M., Chattington, M., Marple-Horvat, D. E. and Smith, N. C. 
2007. A comparison of self-focus versus attentional explanations of 
choking. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 29: 439–456. ) 
recommended that future research in this field should “examine 
attentional and behavioural changes in performers in more ecologically 
valid tasks, which require less forced attentional manipulations” (p. 
454). It is this latter challenge that inspired the present study. 
In summary, the current experiments attempted to circumvent a 
methodological limitation of previous research on conscious processing 
in athletes by employing a more ecologically valid task than used to 
date. Specifically, we requested expert golfers to either attend to or to 
adjust certain aspects of their technique while kinematic aspects of their 
performance were being measured by a motion analysis system. This 
motion analysis system provided an objective method of determining 
whether or not participants actually attended to or adjusted their 
technique in the instructed manner. 
Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to examine the influence of conscious 
processing (in the form of making technical adjustments to a skill) on 
expert golfers' putting proficiency and key kinematic aspects of their 
putting strokes (as measured by a motion analysis system). We 
predicted that expert golfers who made technical adjustments would 
experience impaired putting proficiency and disruption to the timing and 
consistency of their putting strokes. 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 14 male expert golfers participated. Their mean age and 
handicap were 27.14 years (s = 11.42) and 2.6 (s = 1.9) respectively. 
The participants' handicaps ranged from 0 to 6. Ethical approval was 
received from the Human Research Ethics Committee of University 
College, Dublin. 
Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted on an indoor putting green (1.22 × 
3.05 m, Huxley golf green). All participants used their own putters but 
golf balls were provided by the experimenter. The golfers' putting 
actions were examined using a three-dimensional kinematic ultrasound 
system called SAM PuttLab (www.scienceandmotion.com). Briefly, 
SAM PuttLab records putting stroke positional data, stores it on a 
computer, reconstructs movement from the data, and then provides an 
in-depth kinematic analysis of the stroke. SAM Puttlab's accuracy is 
supported by the system's use of more than 210 data points per second, 
recorded to determine the position of one's club with a precision of one-
tenth of a millimetre for position and one-tenth of a millimetre for 
alignment (Science and Motion in Golf, 2005). Evidence to support the 
reliability of the SAM PuttLab system is provided by Karlsen and 
colleagues (Karlsen, Smith, & Nilsson, 2008 Karlsen, J., Smith, G. and 
Nilsson, J. 2008. The stroke has only a minor influence on the direction 
consistency in golf putting among elite players. Journal of Sports 
Sciences, 26: 243–250. ). 
Procedure 
Participants were required to hole golf putts from a distance of 2.5 m 
from the hole. All participants completed a practice condition involving 
five putts (as used by Land & Tenenbaum, 2007 Land, W. M. and 
Tenenbaum, G. 2007. Facilitation of automaticity: Sport-relevant vs. 
non-relevant secondary tasks. Journal of Sport and Exercise 
Psychology, 29(s178)) and two subsequent counterbalanced conditions 
each involving 20 putts (as used by Beilock et al., 2002 Beilock, S. L., 
Carr, T. H., MacMahon, C. and Starkes, J. L. 2002. When paying 
attention becomes counterproductive: Impact of divided versus skill-
focused attention on novice and experienced performance of 
sensorimotor skills. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8: 6–
16. ). The subsequent two conditions represented a “normal” condition 
in which participants received no instructions and a conscious control 
condition in which participants were asked to make a technical 
adjustment to a flawed aspect of their putting stroke. Furthermore, 
participants were instructed to hole as many putts as they could. Two 
aspects of putting performance were measured. First, a scoring 
system – similar to the one adopted by Smith and Holmes (2004 Smith, 
D. and Holmes, P. 2004. The effect of imagery modality on golf putting 
performance. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 26: 385–
395. ) – was used as an index of putting proficiency. Five points were 
awarded to putts that finished in the hole, 3 points to putts that hit the lip 
of the hole but did not go in (with some control over their pace), 2 
points to putts that went past the hole (again, with some control over 
their pace), and 1 point to putts that finished short of the hole. Second, 
the SAM PuttLab examined how technical adjustments influenced 
kinematic aspects (especially timing and consistency) of golfers' putting 
strokes. Accordingly, six relevant putting stroke parameters – impact 
timing, impact velocity, backswing time, forwardswing time, 
consistency, and rhythm – were examined. With respect to the latter two 
variables, stroke consistency was measured by examining the variability 
of participants' impact timing, impact velocity, backswing time, and 
forward swing time. The SAM PuttLab system calculated a consistency 
score by comparing participants' raw data values on each of the 
aforementioned putting stroke parameters with the distribution of 
European Tour golfers' data. In addition, putting stroke rhythm 
measured the ratio of backswing time to impact time (i.e. from the 
initiation of the downswing to the point when the ball is struck). 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
A manipulation check was employed to ensure that all participants made 
the requested change to their putting strokes in the conscious control 
condition. In particular, participants 1, 3, 4, and 6 were instructed to 
reduce the extent to which their putter paths moved to the left of the 
target at impact (see Table I). In contrast, participants 10, 11, and 14 
were instructed to reduce the extent to which they moved their putter 
paths to the right. Participants 2, 5, 7, 8, and 13 were instructed to lower 
their putter rise angles, while participants 9 and 12 were asked to 
increase them. The manipulation check revealed that all participants 
adjusted their putting strokes in the instructed manner. 
Table I.  
Putting proficiency and kinematic data 
The SAM PuttLab system collected kinematic data for all 14 
participants. Each dependent variable (i.e. the index of putting 
proficiency and six kinematic variables) was subjected separately to a 
paired samples t-test to examine how technical adjustments influence 
putting performance. To control for the inflation of Type 1 error rate as 
a result of multiple t-tests, a Bonferroni conversion on the critical P-
value for this set of comparisons was performed, resulting in a P-value 
of 0.007 (0.05/7). 
The act of making technical adjustments had no significant influence on 
participants' putting proficiency (t 13 = 1.44, P > 0.007, d = 0.35), their 
impact velocity (t 13 = −1.92, P > 0.007, d = −0.54) or on their putting 
stroke rhythm (t 13 = −0.93, P > 0.007, d = −0.05). However, technical 
adjustments did significantly influence golfers' backswing times (t 13 = 
−3.80, P <0.007, d = −0.33), forwardswing times (t 13 = 5.40, P <0.007, 
d = −0.56), impact timing (t 13 = 4.01, P <0.007, d = −0.22), and the 
consistency of their putting stroke (t 13 = 6.14, P <0.007, d = 1.4). 
Overall, these results indicate that when expert golfers make technical 
adjustments to their putting strokes, the overall consistency of their 
action is impaired and their putting strokes become significantly slower 
(see Table II). 
Table II. 
Discussion 
We examined the mechanisms by which technical adjustments influence 
the proficiency and kinematic aspects of the putting stroke of expert 
golfers. Performers were required to make technical adjustments to their 
action and the influence of these modifications upon putting proficiency 
and on various kinematic aspects of their putting strokes was examined. 
On the basis of previous conscious processing research (e.g. Mullen & 
Hardy, 2000 Mullen, R. and Hardy, L. 2000. State anxiety and motor 
performance: Testing the conscious processing hypothesis. Journal of 
Sports Sciences, 18: 785–799. ), we anticipated that technical 
adjustments would not only significantly disrupt expert golfers' putting 
proficiency but would also impair the timing and consistency of their 
putting strokes. Our findings may be summarized as follows. 
First, technical adjustments had no significant influence on expert 
golfers' putting proficiency. This result is quite surprising as we 
expected that such a severe form of conscious control (i.e. making 
technical adjustments to a skilled action) would disrupt a normally 
automated movement such as an expert golfer's putting stroke. In line 
with the findings of Collins et al. (2001 Collins, D., Jones, B., 
Fairweather, M., Doolan, S. and Priestley, N. 2001. Examining 
associated changes in movement patterns. International Journal of Sport 
Psychology, 31: 223–242. ), and in contrast to received wisdom, it 
would appear that conscious control (in the form of technical 
adjustments) may not inevitably disrupt task performance. 
Second, using motion analysis technology, we found that four key 
movement parameters of the putting stroke (namely, backswing times, 
forwardswing times, impact timing, and stroke consistency) were 
disrupted by attempting to make technical adjustments to the putting 
stroke. These results are broadly in line with the predictions of the 
progression-regression hypothesis (Fitts et al., 1961 Fitts, P., Bahrick, 
H., Noble, M. and Briggs, G. 1961. Skilled performance, New York: 
Wiley. ), which, as explained earlier, postulates that conscious control 
disrupts the timing and variability of automated movements. However, 
this latter hypothesis did not deal specifically with technical 
adjustments. Thus, our study provides empirical clues as to precisely 
which kinematic aspects of the putting stroke are most likely to break 
down under extreme conscious control (i.e. making technical 
adjustments to a skill). To explain, technically adjusting one's putting 
stroke appears to disrupt the overall consistency of the movement. This 
result supports the findings of MacPherson and colleagues 
(MacPherson, Collins, & Morriss, 2008 MacPherson, A., Collins, D. 
and Morriss, C. 2008. Is what you think what you get? Optimizing 
mental focus for technical performance. The Sport Psychologist, 22: 
288–303. ), who discovered that although an expert javelin thrower who 
focused on improving arm speed subsequently achieved better 
performance on that aspect of the action, “attending to one subroutine 
may have interfered with the consistency of the whole movement” (p. 
299). In summary, the results of Experiment 1 indicate that technical 
adjustments disrupt the timing and consistency of expert golfers' putting 
strokes, yet, despite such conscious interference, expert golfers are 
capable of maintaining performance proficiency. However, the precise 
mechanisms used by these golfers, to achieve proficiency in spite of 
conscious interference, remain to be elucidated. 
There appears to be at least two ways in which performers consciously 
interfere with automated movements – either by exerting control over or 
by simply monitoring their actions. Masters' (1992) theory of 
reinvestment suggests that it is the attempted conscious control of one's 
movements that serves to disrupt skilled performance. In contrast, 
Beilock and Carr's (2001 Beilock, S. and Carr, T. 2001. On the fragility 
of skilled performance: What governs choking under pressure?. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 130: 701–725. ) explicit 
monitoring hypothesis postulates that the disruptive influence comes 
from the act of attending to or consciously monitoring one's movements. 
Jackson and colleagues (Jackson, Ashford, & Norsworthy, 2006 
Jackson, R. C., Ashford, K. J. and Norsworthy, G. 2006. Attentional 
focus, dispositional reinvestment, and skilled motor performance under 
pressure. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 28: 49–68. ) 
proposed that the terms “conscious control” and “explicit monitoring” 
are “logically distinct insofar as instructions to monitor and report a 
particular feature of performance encourage explicit monitoring but do 
not specifically encourage conscious control” (p. 64). Based on this 
distinction between “conscious monitoring” and “conscious control”, 
Jackson et al. (2006 Jackson, R. C., Ashford, K. J. and Norsworthy, G. 
2006. Attentional focus, dispositional reinvestment, and skilled motor 
performance under pressure. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 
28: 49–68. ) speculated that explicit monitoring has a generally 
disruptive effect on motor control and that additional disruption might 
occur when performers attempt to consciously control, as well as 
monitor, their movements. As yet, however, the comparative effects of 
these different types of conscious processing on skilled performance 
have not been investigated empirically. Therefore, Experiment 2 was 
designed to address this unresolved issue. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we employed motion analysis to investigate empirically 
whether or not a certain form of conscious control (i.e. making technical 
adjustments) and conscious monitoring (i.e. paying attention to a 
specific aspect of one's skill) will have differential influences upon the 
putting proficiency and putting stroke kinematics of expert golfers. 
The objectives in Experiment 2 were twofold. First, we examined the 
relative effects of two different types of conscious processing (i.e. 
technical adjustments and conscious monitoring) on expert golfers' 
putting performance. This objective was achieved by exploring expert 
golfers' performance in three experimental conditions: a condition in 
which they were instructed to putt as they normally would (normal 
condition), a condition in which they were instructed to adjust their 
putting stroke (technical adjustment), and a condition in which they 
were instructed to monitor a specific aspect of their stroke (conscious 
monitoring). In the conscious monitoring condition, participants were 
instructed to monitor their impact spot (clubhead–ball impact), a method 
that was used previously by Land and Tenenbaum (2007 Land, W. M. 
and Tenenbaum, G. 2007. Facilitation of automaticity: Sport-relevant 
vs. non-relevant secondary tasks. Journal of Sport and Exercise 
Psychology, 29(s178)). In Land and Tenenbaum's study, expert golfers 
performed a putting task under high- and low-pressure situations while 
carrying out two types of secondary tasks: a traditional secondary task 
consisting of random letter generation, and a sport-relevant task 
consisting of monitoring the impact of clubhead on ball. The results 
supported the authors' hypothesis that monitoring clubhead impact 
would increase automaticity (and hence increase motion consistency) 
and “would prevent a return to conscious processing” (p. S178). Land 
and Tenenbaum's (2007 Land, W. M. and Tenenbaum, G. 2007. 
Facilitation of automaticity: Sport-relevant vs. non-relevant secondary 
tasks. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 29(s178)) hypothesis 
seems to be at odds with Beilock and Carr's (2001 Beilock, S. and Carr, 
T. 2001. On the fragility of skilled performance: What governs choking 
under pressure?. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130: 
701–725. ) explicit monitoring hypothesis, however, as the latter 
postulated that monitoring one's action represents a form of conscious 
processing that typically disrupts expert movement and performance. 
As previously noted, Jackson et al. (2006 Jackson, R. C., Ashford, K. J. 
and Norsworthy, G. 2006. Attentional focus, dispositional reinvestment, 
and skilled motor performance under pressure. Journal of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology, 28: 49–68. ) stated that “instructions to monitor 
and report a particular feature of performance encourage explicit 
monitoring” (p. 64). Therefore, in contrast to Land and Tenenbaum's 
(2007 Land, W. M. and Tenenbaum, G. 2007. Facilitation of 
automaticity: Sport-relevant vs. non-relevant secondary tasks. Journal 
of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 29(s178)) hypothesis, we predicted 
that requiring skilled golfers to attend to their clubhead impact spot 
actually involves them in monitoring their clubhead movement before 
and at impact – thereby constituting a form of step-by-step conscious 
monitoring. 
The second objective of Experiment 2 was to rectify a possible 
methodological deficiency of Experiment 1 – the fact that we cannot be 
sure exactly what participants attended to in the “normal” condition. In 
Experiment 2 we addressed this issue by employing a “think-aloud” 
protocol while participants performed in the normal condition (i.e. when 
left to their own devices). Thus, Experiment 2 used “think-aloud” 
protocols in an attempt to identify precisely what features of their 
putting performance expert golfers attend to when asked to adopt their 
“normal focus”. We hoped that this method would elucidate the extent 
to which expert golfers focus on technical thoughts (thereby indicating a 
proclivity to “reinvest”) relating to the execution of the putting stroke. 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 18 male expert golfers participated. Their mean age and 
handicap were 29.2 years (s = 11.46) and 3.56 (s = 1.88) respectively. 
The participants' handicaps ranged from 0 to 6. Participants also 
provided informed consent before taking part in this study. Like 
Experiment 1, ethical approval for the study was received from the 
Human Research Ethics Committee of University College, Dublin. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus was the same as used in Experiment 1 with the addition 
of a dictaphone (Sony tp-s350) to record the “think-aloud” protocol. 
Procedure 
All participants completed a practice condition involving five putts and 
three subsequent counterbalanced conditions (a “normal condition”, a 
technical adjustment condition, and a monitoring condition) each 
involving 20 putts. The practice condition was conducted to allow 
participants to familiarize themselves with the green. Each putt was 
taken from the same spot 2.5 m from the hole. 
In each of the three conditions, participants were instructed to hole as 
many putts as possible. Putting proficiency was measured by using the 
same scoring system used in Experiment 1 and by measuring the four 
kinematic aspects (i.e. consistency, forwardswing times, backswing 
times, and impact timing) of the putting stroke found to be influenced 
by technical adjustments. 
In the normal condition, all participants performed 20 putts. They were 
instructed simply to hole as many putts as possible. The “think-aloud” 
protocol took place after the tenth putt. The dictaphone was switched on 
and participants were instructed to state aloud any thoughts relating to 
the task of which they were consciously aware. Participants were 
instructed to state aloud any task-related thoughts while they were 
addressing the ball and once the putt had been executed. When 
participants had finished stating such thoughts, the dictaphone was 
switched off and participants were instructed to complete the remaining 
10 putts in the condition. 
The conscious monitoring condition involved instructing participants to 
monitor their clubhead impact spot for each of the 20 putts in the 
condition. Participants were instructed to attempt to hole as many putts 
as possible and to report, after each putt, exactly where on the putter 
face they thought they had struck the putt (e.g. on the sweet spot, the 
heel or the toe of the putter face). After every fifth putt participants were 
reminded to maintain this focus. 
Finally, the technical adjustment condition was conducted in the same 
manner as in Experiment 1. 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
As in Experiment 1, manipulation checks were used. First, we attempted 
to verify whether the golfers had maintained the specified focus in the 
conscious monitoring condition. This was achieved by examining the 
accuracy of participants' impact spot judgements for each putt. Initially, 
a criterion level was established to identify whether a participant had 
successfully identified their impact spot on each putt. This criterion 
level was based on SAM PuttLab's optimal scoring ranges for each 
movement parameter. In that scoring system, a ball struck 3.5 mm from 
the centre of the putter face represents a score of 75%, which “indicates 
a very good performance inside the Tour Pros benchmark range” (SAM 
PuttLab report). If a participant stated that contact was made at the 
sweet spot, then it would have to have been struck no more than 3.5 mm 
from the centre of the club-face for it to qualify as an accurate 
judgement. Similarly, if a participant stated that they had hit a putt out 
of the heel or toe of the club-face, the PuttLab would be required to 
reveal that the ball had indeed been struck out from these places. 
The preceding manipulation check demonstrated that 14 of the 18 
participants made at least 16 out of 20 accurate judgements (a success 
rate of 80%). This result suggests that these participants generally 
adhered to the instructions in the conscious monitoring condition. 
However, 4 of the 18 participants made only 5, 5, 7, and 10 accurate 
responses, respectively. Although these participants may have adhered 
to the attentional focus instructions that they had received, they appear 
to have been relatively poor judges of the exact spot on the putter face 
where they had struck each putt. It is also possible that these participants 
may have ignored the attentional focus instructions, thereby rendering 
them incapable of making accurate impact spot judgements. Given the 
uncertainty surrounding the impact spot judgements of these four 
participants in the conscious monitoring task, all data were analysed 
with and without these problem participants, a procedure recommended 
by Mullen and colleagues (Mullen, Hardy, & Tattersall, 2005 Mullen, 
R., Hardy, L. and Tattersall, A. 2005. The effects of anxiety on motor 
performance: A test of the conscious processing hypothesis. Journal of 
Sport and Exercise Psychology, 27: 212–225. ). Removal of the problem 
participants produced a set of results that did not differ from those 
obtained with the full set. Therefore, data from all the participants are 
reported here. 
The second manipulation check was conducted for the technical 
adjustment condition to ensure that participants had adhered to the 
conscious control instructions. Six participants were required to adjust 
the rise angle of their putter, six were requested to adjust their putter 
paths, and six were instructed to lower their club-face rotation (i.e. the 
extent to which the putter-face opens) on the backswing. Analysis of the 
results indicated that all participants adhered to these conscious control 
instructions. 
A third manipulation check was carried out to ensure that participants 
did not consciously control their putting strokes during the conscious 
monitoring condition in an attempt to make contact at the sweet spot. 
When comparing golfers' kinematic results in the normal and the 
conscious monitoring condition, there were no differences in their 
performance as measured by a number of key kinematic variables 
related to achieving accurate impact spots (e.g. putter path, putter face 
rotation, and ultimately the impact spot itself). This latter result 
indicated that participants refrained from using conscious control in the 
conscious monitoring condition. 
The SAM PuttLab system was used to collect kinematic data for all 18 
participants. The independent variable was the attentional condition 
(type of conscious processing) in which participants performed: normal, 
technical adjustment, and conscious monitoring. The dependent 
variables were golf putting proficiency (as measured by the scoring 
system outlined in Experiment 1) and the four putting movement 
parameters from Experiment 1 that conscious control had been found to 
influence, namely backswing times, forwardswing times, impact timing, 
and consistency. A one-way repeated measures multivariate analysis of 
variance was conducted to examine whether the attentional condition 
had any influence on participants' putting proficiency and on the four 
aforementioned movement parameters. Prior to analysis, checks were 
conducted for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, 
homogeneity of variance–covariance matrices, and multicollinearity. No 
significant violations of these assumptions were evident. 
Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of attentional condition 
on the five dependent variables (V = 0.72, F 2,62 = 3.5, P <0.05, η 
2 = 0.38). Separate univariate analyses of variance on the dependent 
variables found that attentional condition had no effect on expert golfers' 
forwardswing times (F 2,34 = 2.85, P > 0.01, η 2 = 0.14,) backswing 
times (F 2,34 = 2.26, P > 0.01, η 2 = 0.18) or on their impact timing (F 
2,34 = 1.42, P > 0.01, η 2  = 0.08). However, the univariate analysis 
revealed a significant effect of attentional condition on expert golfers' 
putting proficiency (F 2,34 = 6.05, P <0.01, η2  = 0.26) and on the 
consistency of their putting strokes (F 2,34 = 6.19, P <0.01, η 2  = 0.27). 
A series of pairwise comparisons (using Bonferroni adjustments) was 
subsequently conducted to determine precisely how conscious 
processing influenced expert golfers' putting proficiency and putting 
stroke consistency. The golfers' putting proficiency was significantly 
higher in the normal condition than in the conscious monitoring 
condition (P = 0.005). In line with the results from Experiment 1, 
technical adjustments were found not to disrupt putting proficiency 
compared with performance in the normal condition (P = 0.52). In 
addition, putting proficiency was similar in the conscious monitoring 
and technical adjustment condition (P = 1). Taken together, these results 
suggest that expert golfers found conscious monitoring to be disruptive 
to their overall putting proficiency. 
With regard to the influence of conscious processing, conscious 
monitoring was found to have no greater influence on the consistency of 
the putting stroke than was evident in the normal condition (P = 1). 
However, expert golfers' putting strokes were significantly less 
consistent in the technical adjustment condition compared with the 
normal condition (P = 0.49) and compared with the conscious 
monitoring condition (P = 0.03). Clearly, as in the case of Experiment 1, 
the use of technical adjustments appears to increase the variability of 
expert golfers' putting strokes (see Table III). 
Table III.  
Think-aloud protocol analysis 
All 18 of the “think-aloud” protocol responses were computer-
transcribed and printed out for examination. Overall, a total of 24 
statements were extracted from the protocols (see Table IV). Such 
“think-aloud” statements were analysed and a number of themes were 
identified. These themes were deductively generated with reference to 
the different types of attentional focus allegedly adopted by expert 
performers (see Castaneda & Gray, 2007 Castaneda, B. and Gray, R. 
2007. Effects of focus of attention on baseball batting performance in 
players of differing skill levels. Journal of Sport and Exercise 
Psychology, 29: 60–77. ; Wulf, 2007 Wulf, G. 2007. Attentional focus 
and motor learning: A review of 10 years of research. E-Journal 
Bewegung und Training, 1: 4–14. ). For example, Wulf (2007 Wulf, G. 
2007. Attentional focus and motor learning: A review of 10 years of 
research. E-Journal Bewegung und Training, 1: 4–14. ) distinguished 
between the adoption of an internal focus of attention (i.e. focusing on 
limb movement) and an external focus of attention (i.e. focusing on 
movement of an implement such as a golf putter-head). Furthermore, 
Castaneda and Gray (2007 Castaneda, B. and Gray, R. 2007. Effects of 
focus of attention on baseball batting performance in players of differing 
skill levels. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 29: 60–77. ) 
suggested that an expert performer may adopt an environmental focus of 
attention (e.g. focusing on movement of a golf ball as it leaves the 
putter-head). 
Table IV.   
From the analysis of the protocol statements, three broad themes 
initially emerged (i.e. internal focus, external focus, environmental 
focus). However, because a number of statements did not fit these three 
categories, an additional theme relating to the rhythm or timing of the 
action was generated. This additionally generated theme meant that a 
total of four themes emerged from Experiment 2. These themes were 
labelled as follows: (i) skill-internal, (ii) skill-external, (iii) 
environmental-external, and (iv) rhythm or timing. 
To ensure that the experimenters did not unwittingly assign any 
statements to the incorrect category, five raters (mean age 25.3 years, 
s = 1.8) were asked to match each statement with the theme to which it 
appeared to belong most appropriately. This procedure led to the 
reliable matching of all 24 statements with appropriate themes. 
Importantly, all of the participants correctly assigned statements to the 
inductively generated theme (rhythm/timing). 
Protocol analysis results 
The “think-aloud” protocol showed that 14 participants reported 
between two and four task-related thoughts, while the other four 
participants reported only one task-related thought. In total, participants 
reported a mean of 2.16 (s = 0.87) task-related thoughts during 
performance. With regard to each individual theme, participants 
reported a mean of 0.5 (s = 0.85) skill-internal rules, a mean of 0.61 
(s = 0.5) skill-external rules, a mean of 0.72 (s = 0.67) environmental-
external rules, and a mean of 0.33 (s = 0.59) rhythm or timing rules. 
When considering the extent to which performers reinvested conscious 
attention into the mechanics of their strokes, we may discount 
environmental-external rules attended to as this focus of attention 
directed participants' attention away from technical elements of the 
action. Therefore, when taking into account skill-internal, skill-external, 
and rhythm/timing rules attended to, participants had a mean of 1.44 
(s = 0.52) thoughts. This result suggests that when left to adopt their 
normal focus of attention, expert golfers in the current study focused on 
between one and two technique-related thoughts. 
Discussion 
The findings from Experiment 2 provide support for our prediction that 
technical adjustments and explicit monitoring would have different 
influences on expert golfers' putting stroke proficiency and their putting 
movement kinematics. Specifically, expert golfers' putting strokes were 
significantly more consistent in the normal and conscious monitoring 
conditions than in the technical adjustment condition. However, 
although the consistency of participants' putting strokes was unaffected 
by engaging in conscious monitoring, it would appear that when golfers 
were asked to attend to and report on a particular feature of movement 
(i.e. the impact spot), their overall putting proficiency was significantly 
impaired. This finding has important practical implications for golfers 
who may wish to focus on specific “swing thoughts” during movement. 
Specifically, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that golfers may need 
to choose their swing thoughts very carefully because focusing on 
certain elements of movement, such as the impact spot, could lead to an 
impairment in performance proficiency. In line with the results of 
Experiment 1, technical adjustments did not significantly impair putting 
proficiency. Furthermore, although the consistency of golfers' putting 
strokes differed as a function of conscious processing conditions, 
technical adjustments and conscious monitoring had no significant 
influence on the other three kinematic measures (i.e. backswing times, 
forwardswing times, and impact timing) of the putting stroke. In 
contrast to Experiment 1, technical adjustments had no significant 
influence on the timing of expert golfers' putting strokes. 
How can we reconcile these apparently contradictory results? When we 
analyse the relevant mean scores across conditions (see Table III), we 
see that, despite the absence of statistical differences, participants' 
forwardswing, backswing, and impact times are noticeably slower in the 
technical adjustment condition than in the normal condition – a trend in 
line with that seen in Experiment 1. Thus Experiment 2 lends tentative 
support to Experiment 1 by suggesting that attempts to adjust technique 
tend to slow down the timing of expert golfers' putting strokes. 
Turning to the protocol analysis results, it seems that expert golfers pay 
attention to technical aspects of their movement when left to their own 
devices. This finding is interesting because although Beilock and Carr 
(2001 Beilock, S. and Carr, T. 2001. On the fragility of skilled 
performance: What governs choking under pressure?. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 130: 701–725. ) and Masters and 
Maxwell (2008 Masters, R. S. W. and Maxwell, J. 2008. The theory of 
reinvestment. International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 1: 
160–183. ) claimed that skill-focused attention disrupts the procedural 
nature of skilled performance, Ericsson (2001 Ericsson, K. A. 2001. 
“The path to expert golf performance: Insights from the masters on how 
to improve performance by deliberate practice”. In Optimising 
performance in golf, Edited by: Thomas, P. R. 1–57. Brisbane, QLD: 
pAustralian Academic Press. ) has argued that a defining characteristic 
of such performance is the fact that experts appear to be able to monitor 
and control their “on-line” performance. However, a close look at the 
protocol analysis results (see Table IV) indicates that when left to their 
own devices, many of the performers were preoccupied with looking at 
the target to ensure that their clubs were correctly aligned with the hole. 
In fact, this approach led to participants' best putting performance 
occurring in the normal condition. In contrast, instructions to 
consciously monitor “on-line” performance appear to have impaired 
putting proficiency. This latter finding is more closely in line with the 
prediction that expert performance is better facilitated by a lack of “on-
line” attentional control (as postulated by Beilock et al., 2002 Beilock, 
S. L., Carr, T. H., MacMahon, C. and Starkes, J. L. 2002. When paying 
attention becomes counterproductive: Impact of divided versus skill-
focused attention on novice and experienced performance of 
sensorimotor skills. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8: 6–
16.and Masters, 1992 Masters, R. S. W. 1992. Knowledge, knerves and 
know-how: The role of explicit versus implicit knowledge in the 
breakdown of a complex motor skill under pressure. British Journal of 
Psychology, 83: 343–358. ) than by the monitoring and control of 
technique during real-time performance (as postulated by Ericsson, 
2001 Ericsson, K. A. 2001. “The path to expert golf performance: 
Insights from the masters on how to improve performance by deliberate 
practice”. In Optimising performance in golf, Edited by: Thomas, P. R. 
1–57. Brisbane, QLD: pAustralian Academic Press. ). 
General discussion 
The experiments reported here examined the effects of different types of 
conscious processing (making “technical adjustments” or consciously 
manipulating one's movement and “conscious monitoring” or paying 
attention to the execution of the putting stroke) on two indices of skilled 
performance by expert golfers – namely, putting proficiency (measured 
by a points scoring system) and various kinematic aspects of the putting 
stroke (measured by the SAM PuttLab motion analysis system). By 
using a motion analysis system, our experiments have two 
methodological advantages over previous studies in this field. First, we 
addressed the validation problem whereby “one cannot ensure that 
participants actually monitor their movements in accordance with the 
instruction” (Jackson et al., 2006 Jackson, R. C., Ashford, K. J. and 
Norsworthy, G. 2006. Attentional focus, dispositional reinvestment, and 
skilled motor performance under pressure. Journal of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology, 28: 49–68.p. 64). The SAM PuttLab motion 
analysis system enabled us to provide an objective manipulation check 
on the degree to which participants actually adhered to the attentional 
instructions that they had received. Second, this system allowed 
participants to be instructed to engage in conscious processing (either 
technical adjustments or conscious monitoring) without the need to 
employ secondary tasks (e.g. auditory tone monitoring) that may reflect 
“arbitrary and contrived” (Wilson et al., 2007 Wilson, M., Chattington, 
M., Marple-Horvat, D. E. and Smith, N. C. 2007. A comparison of self-
focus versus attentional explanations of choking. Journal of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology, 29: 439–456.p. 454) attentional manipulations. 
Experiment 1 found that technical adjustments did slow down and 
disrupt a number of important kinematic features (e.g. backswing times) 
of golfers' putting strokes. This finding is in line with research (e.g. 
Gray, 2004 Gray, R. 2004. Attending to the execution of a complex 
sensorimotor skill: Expertise differences and slumps. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Applied, 10: 42–54. ) that has demonstrated 
that conscious processing impairs expert performance by disrupting the 
sequencing and timing of automated movement. However, the 
disruption to the timing and consistency of the putting stroke appears to 
have had little influence on expert golfers' putting proficiency. 
Experiment 2 showed that conscious monitoring had a more disruptive 
influence on putting proficiency than did the use of technical 
adjustments. A possible explanation for this latter finding comes from 
dynamical systems theory (see Davids, Button, & Bennett, 2008 Davids, 
K., Button, C. and Bennett, S. 2008. Dynamics of skill acquisition: A 
constraints-led approach, Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. ), which 
emphasizes the important role of functional variability in achieving 
successful motor performance. Specifically, this theory proposes that 
degrees of freedom (the number of ways in which limbs can move and 
joints rotate) are used as a resource to enhance adaptive movement 
behaviours during performance (Glazier & Davids, 2009 Glazier, P. S. 
and Davids, K. 2009. Optimization of performance in top-level athletes: 
An action-focused coping approach (commentary). International 
Journal of Sports Science and Coaching, 4: 59–62. ). Accordingly, the 
expert golfers in Experiment 2 may have performed more proficiently in 
the technical adjustment condition than in the conscious monitoring 
condition because they engaged in compensatory variability when 
instructed to adjust their putting strokes. In contrast, no such movement 
variability was observed in the conscious monitoring condition. The act 
of consciously attending to an aspect of the putting stroke (i.e. impact 
spot) appears to have been a sufficient distraction to reduce putting 
proficiency. The results of Experiment 2 provide some evidence that 
different forms of conscious processing (i.e. conscious monitoring and 
technical adjustments) may have differential influences on expert 
movement and performance proficiency in golf putting. However, 
further research is required to validate this theoretical explanation. 
A possible methodological limitation associated with both experiments 
concerns the nature of the technical adjustment instructions provided for 
participants. Participants were required to adjust their technique in a 
manner that improved or “fixed” a flawed aspect of their movement. 
Such instructions may have led to the disruption of certain kinematic 
aspects of the putting stroke (e.g. its consistency) but may not have had 
any significant influence on putting proficiency because the adjustments 
made could have overridden the disruptive effects of conscious control 
on performance outcome. In an effort to obviate this possibility, we 
recommend that researchers address this issue by using a control 
condition in which participants are given neutral technical adjustment 
instructions. 
A practical implication of the findings from our experiments is that it 
would appear prudent for skilled performers to avoid consciously 
attending to their movement during competitive performance. However, 
as discovered by Nicholls et al. (2005 Nicholls, A. R., Holt, N. L., 
Polman, R. C. J. and James, D. W. G. 2005. Stress and coping among 
international adolescent golfers. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 
17: 330–340. ), elite amateur golfers occasionally use technical 
adjustments as a coping strategy in pressurized situations. 
Unsurprisingly, however, technical adjustments in this latter case failed 
to improve performance. Nevertheless, evidence that performers may 
engage in this excessive form of conscious control raises a number of 
important questions. For example, do certain performers (e.g. high 
reinvesters) have a proclivity to use technical adjustments under 
pressurized conditions (Poolton, Maxwell, & Masters, 2004 Poolton, J., 
Maxwell, J. and Masters, R. 2004. Rules for reinvestment. Perceptual 
and Motor Skills, 99: 771–774. )? If so, what can be done to prevent 
such attempted conscious control during performance? In future, 
researchers could address these questions by examining the degree to 
which the use of emotion-focused coping strategies (e.g. positive 
appraisal or acceptance of mistakes) prevents skilled performers from 
engaging in excessive conscious analysis. Another interesting line of 
enquiry stems from the suggestion by Gucciardi and Dimmock (2008 
Gucciardi, D. F. and Dimmock, J. A. 2008. Choking under pressure in 
sensorimotor skills: Conscious processing or depleted attentional 
resources?. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 9: 45–59. ) that certain 
forms of conscious processing (e.g. the use of global cue words) may 
actually prevent the regression to conscious control by allowing 
performers to “focus their attention and trigger their implicit processes 
stored in memory” (p. 56). Research is urgently required to test this 
prediction. 
Overall, the present results suggest that different types of conscious 
processing seem to have contrasting influences upon expert performance 
and movement. More precisely, our findings indicate that for golfers, 
conscious control (in the form of technical adjustments) may disrupt the 
timing and consistency of automated movement – despite having no 
influence on overall putting proficiency. In contrast, the act of conscious 
monitoring may disrupt performance proficiency but have no influence 
on automated movement. The protocol analysis in Experiment 2 
indicates that expert golfers' putting was most proficient in the normal 
condition where they focused externally or on rhythmical properties of 
their movement. This latter finding is in line with recent evidence 
suggesting that experts' performance and movement are most effective 
when their attention is directed externally to the effects that such 
movements have on the environment (e.g. Castaneda & Gray, 2007 
Castaneda, B. and Gray, R. 2007. Effects of focus of attention on 
baseball batting performance in players of differing skill levels. Journal 
of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 29: 60–77. ) or to rhythmical 
“sources of information” (e.g. MacPherson et al., 2008 MacPherson, A., 
Collins, D. and Morriss, C. 2008. Is what you think what you get? 
Optimizing mental focus for technical performance. The Sport 
Psychologist, 22: 288–303. ). Unfortunately, it is not clear if specific 
foci of attention will prevent certain skilled performers (e.g. high 
reinvesters) from reinvesting their automated movements with 
conscious attention during competitive performance. Clearly, further 
research is required to examine this possibility. 
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 Table I. Manipulation check for Experiment 1  
Parameter adjusted Normal Technical adjustment condition 
(1) Putter path 5.9° left 4.7° left 
(2) Rise angle 6.6° 4.4° 
(3) Putter path 5.3° left 4.5° left 
(4) Putter path 12.1° left 2.1° left 
(5) Rise angle 6.0° 4.5° 
(6) Putter path 5.3° left 4.2° left 
(7) Rise angle 6.5° 4.3° 
(8) Rise angle 5.4° 2.6° 
(9) Rise angle 0.0° 1.1° 
(10) Putter path 2.7° right 1.7° right 
(11) Putter path 2.5° right 1.8° right 
(12) Rise angle 0.3° 1.1° 
(13) Rise angle 4.3° 2.9° 
(14) Putter path 5.5° right 3.5° right 
 
Table II. Mean scores (s) for expert golfers' putting proficiency and 






Putting proficiency 87.64 (8.51) 83.64 (13.94) 
Consistency 75.88 (6.8) 66.6 (6.9) 
Backswing time (ms) 641.35 (70) 664.64 (73.02) 
Forwardswing time 
(ms) 
858.28 (125) 930.28 (133.38) 
Impact timing (ms) 326.25 (50.54) 337.85 (53.09) 
Impact velocity (ms) 1174.57 (53.7) 1204.57 (57.46) 





Table III. Mean scores (s) for expert golfers' putting proficiency and 
kinematic measures of the putting stroke across attentional conditions 



























301.91 (47.76) 311.63 (56.22) 
Consistency 74.66 (9.19) 75.46 (9.57) 68.58 (11.35) 
 
  
Table IV. Themes and statements generated  
Theme Statement 
Skill-internal (1) Settle over it as I take the stance 
  (2) Left hand grip weak 
  (3) Grip the putter, make sure it's right 
  (4) Get my weight right on my feet 
  (5) Pushing my chest out 
  (6) Get my hands ahead of the ball 2  
  (7) Thinking about the connection of the upper half of my left 
arm to my body 
  (8) Hard right grip and soft with the left hand 
Skill-external (1) Just line up the putter face as I'm standing behind the ball 
  (2) Aim the blade square at the hole 3  
  (3) Keep it (clubface) square back and through 
  (4) Looking down and think the putter face is slightly open 
  (5) Just hold it (clubface) off 
  (6) I'm thinking make sure the putter doesn't come too far back 
on the inside 
  (7) Just make sure I get the putter head square instead of 
slightly open 
  (8) Face closed, trying to open the face a bit 
  (9) Feeling the putter like a pendulum 
Environmental-
external 
(1) Just look at the target 9  
(2) Just about getting your alignment and everything 
  (3) Focusing on the number two (on the ball) 
  (4) Line it up and make sure you allow enough for the left 
edge 
Rhythm/timing (1) Back and through 3  
  (2) Accelerate through 
  (3) Smooth back 3  
Note: Bold numbers represent number of participants who made these specific 
statements. 
 
